Such as technical interruptions, inexplicable anomalies, and a conflict with the current constitution.
Electronic voting in Estonia started in 2005. With its pilot project for municipal elections, Estonia became the first country to hold legally binding general elections using the Internet. Estonian election officials declared the electronic voting system a success and found it passed the pudding test. However, the reality is different.
Electronic voting has been plagued by constant problems, including technical glitches, unexplained anomalies, and conflicts with the current constitution.
The Internet voting system is based on the Estonian identity card, which is not a smart card. The main problem with this solution is that verifying the voter's identity is actually impossible. Anyone with access to the card and its PIN can vote, and it is impossible to detect this kind of violation. In a general election, a security breach like this could result in a significant bias in the final outcome of the vote.
Software development could be safer, since all functions are in the hands of a small group of interconnected actors. However, the dubious Venezuelan company Smartmatic, which is suspected of election fraud in several countries, plays a secret role in this story.
In 2014, Professor Halderman of the University of Michigan, with the help of international e-voting experts, conducted a security analysis of the Estonias internet voting system. A number of deficiencies in operational security and procedures were discovered, including a dangerously low level of professionalism in security administration. This makes the entire system open to attack and manipulation.
The use of electronic voting was the subject of debate among experts. Despite the fact that it was recommended to be withdrawn due to potential problems, it is still used today as before.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the organizers of electronic elections did not allow independent experts to check the system. Although local checks have been carried out, more is needed to ensure that voting results are realistic and accurate. There were times when the number of electronic votes cast for a candidate did not match the number of paper votes or the candidate's popularity in public opinion polls. Unfortunately, the bodies conducting the elections ignored these concerns and did not provide an explanation for the said discrepancies.
Mike Calamus, board member of the Estonian Konservatiivne Eesti (Conservative Estonia).
Featured image: Mike Calamus / civilek.info
